tiffs' claims under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 7 in Marshel and Green is typical of the expansive 10b-5 jurisprudence of the 1960s and early 1970s. This Note will discuss the viability of continued expansion of 10b-5 relief in light of two recent Supreme Court decisions which indicate a more restrictive attitude toward private actions under 10b-5. 8 of eliminating the minority shareholders constituted a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty and thus violated rule 10b-5. 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976). The court's opinions in Marshel and Green emphasized that the primary objection to the defendant's action was that it lacked a corporate purpose and benefitted only the controlling shareholders. 533 F.2d at 1280-82; 533 F.2d at 1286-88, 1290. Green distinguished Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972), on the ground that the merger approved by the court in Popkin had been required by the terms of a settlement in a prior case and therefore fulfilled the corporate purpose test. 533 F.2d at 1291.
Rehearing en banc was denied in Green and Marshel. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir. 1976).
In Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 568-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974) , the Fifth Circuit had discussed a similar corporate purpose test in the context of a lob-5 action. Since adequate support was found in state law and general equity principles, however, the court's holding in favor of the plaintiff minority shareholder was not entirely dependent on the application of that test, as it was in Green and Marshel. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b-5 (1975) . The SEC adopted rule 10b-5 to fill a perceived gap in the protection of sellers of securities. Buyers had been specifically provided for by section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970) . The language of rule 10b-5 is substantially the same as that of section 17. At the time it was promulgated, the SEC expressed no intent to create a private right of action. It was assumed that the rule would be used by the SEC primarily as authority for injunctions in connection with its enforcement actions. By 1947 a federal court had implied a private right of action. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified on other grounds, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947 ). The Supreme Court acknowledged the private right in its second case involving 10b-5, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). For specific comments by one of the drafters of rule 10b-5 on the events surrounding its adoption, see Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) . See generally 1 BROM3ERG § § 2.2 (400-450); 6 Loss 3869-73.
8. This attitude appears also to extend to other sections of the securities laws.
The trend toward liberal interpretation of section 10(b) and rule "10b-5 which has emerged in the courts of appeals over the last decade 9 has been premised largely upon the view that the securities statutes are remedial in nature and therefore must be construed flexibly to protect investors. 10 With respect to section 10(b), the liberal approach taken by the circuits could claim some early support from Supreme Court decisions construing other sections of the securities statutes. 1 The Supreme Court itself took an expansive view of the statute when it first considered rule lOb-5 in SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 2 In deciding whether the fraudulent conduct sought to be enjoined by the SEC involved a "purchase" or "sale" of securities, the Court noted that the statutory definitions of those terms were "unhelpful,"' 3 and concluded that the proper inquiry was whether the "alleged conduct is the type of fraudulent behavior which was meant to be forbidden by the statute and the rule." 14 A consideration of the alleged fraudulent conduct by defendants in National Securities led to the conclusion that 11. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), Justice Goldberg, writing for the Court, stated: "Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195 (footnote omitted). Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (Warren, C.J.), a case construing the meaning of the term "security" under section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, also provided support: " [W] e are guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities Exchange Act quite clearly falls into the category of remedial legislation." Id. at 336 (footnote omitted).
12. 393 U.S. 453 (1969). The National Securities case involved an action brought by the SEC under rule lob-5 rather than a private action. At issue was whether alleged misrepresentations and omissions of material facts communicated to insurance company shareholders in an effort to secure approval of a planned merger fell within the coverage of section 10b and rule lob-5. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 751 n.14 (1975), the Court noted that this earlier decision "established that the purchaser-seller rule imposes no limitation on the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5."
13. 393 U.S. at 466. 14. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
[Vol 20. 404 U.S. at 12-13. The conduct held actionable was a complex scheme whereby a company was fraudulently induced to use its own assets to fund a purchase of its securities by an outside party. The Court's use of the word "touch" represented a broad construction of the phrase "in connection with" a purchase or sale, found in both section 10(b) and rule lob-5. See note 7 supra. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, did not consider 10(b)'s relationship to other sections of the statute.
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held that reliance on a misrepresentation need not be specifically proved by a 10b-5 plaintiff; in the view of the Court, a sufficient showing of reliance is made upon proof of nondisclosure of a "material" fact, defined as information which "a reasonable investor might have con- 24 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Birnbaum rule, which mandates that a plaintiff be a 21. 406 U.S. at 153-54. The complaint arose out of th6 administration of a federal program to partition and distribute the assets of the Ute Tribe between whole-blood and mixed-blood members. As part of the program, mixed-bloods seeking to dispose of their shares in the tribe's oil and mineral rights were required to give first-refusal rights to the whole-blood membership. The fraudulent misstatements consisted of assertions by officers of a transfer agent bank to prospective mixed-blood sellers that the price being offered was the market price, when the latter was in fact significantly higher. In holding that the plaintiffs need not show that they relied on the defendants' nondisclosures, the Court eliminated one of the elements of common law fraud which had been thought to apply to actions under 10b-5. See 3 Loss at 1435-36.
The Court has recently indicated that the language in the case which purported to define "material" is no longer a complete and authoritative statement of the law. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 n.9 (1976).
22. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text. Professor Bromberg has recently stated the case even more strongly:
I think it is well to look on lob-5 with a hard, realistic eye as being a kind of carte blanche to the federal courts to create what we talked about a few years ago as common law corporate responsibility, and what I would like to suggest seems to be, more broadly, common law standards for financial transactions.
I think the development has gone on with virtually no statutory basis. That is barely a pretext now ....
K. BIALKIN & H. END3ERG, THE 10B SmUES oF RULES 50 (Practising Law Institute 1975).
23. See notes 29, 39-40 infra and accompanying text. 24. 421 U.S. 723 (1975) . In Blue Chip, plaintiffs, as a result of an antitrust consent decree, were given an opportunity to purchase shares of the Blue Chip Stamp Company at a set price. They did not purchase, allegedly because of an overly pessimistic prospectus which was designed to discourage them so that the shares could be offered to the public at a higher price. 421 U.S. at 726-27. The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs had standing to sue, notwithstanding the Birnbaum rule which restricted standing to buyers and sellers. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973). The court reasoned that the status of an offeree was similar to that of a party with contract rights who is protected under the statutory definition of "buy"
[Vol. 1976:789 purchaser or seller of securities in order to have standing to sue under rule lOb-5. 5 Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist traced the rise of the implied private right of action under 10b-5, 26 outlining the development of the Birnbaum rule and its application by the courts of appeals .
2
He then discussed the "congressional scheme" as reflected by the text of the statute and the available extrinsic evidence. 28 Despite this criticism, the rule had been generally followed. 29. Justice Rehnquist's construction was based on his conviction that the Securities Acts are "carefully drawn." 421 U.S. at 730, 733 n.5. Where Congress included a particular provision in one section of the statute and omitted it in a parallel section, Justice Rehnquist would regard the omission as intended by Congress. Contradictions and omissions must, therefore, be carefully noted and respected. The end result of such a construction could be the destruction of the private right of action under those sections, including 10(b), where it is not mentioned explicitly. In discussing the application of this "doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius" to the five general antifraud provisions of the securities statutes and rules (sections 11(a), 12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act and rules 15cl-2 and 10b-5), Professor Bromberg noted that the doctrine "has a respectable history and logic." 1 BROMBERG § 2.4(1) at 27. He concluded, however, that "the history of lOb-5 is a massive rejection of this approach." The insistence of Justices Rehnquist and Powell on the importance of this type of statutory construction represents a major change in the method of analyzing 10b-5 questions. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text. 
RULE 10b-5
tice Rehnquist confessed to doubts about his ability to "divine from the language of section 10(b) the express 'intent of Congress.' "I' Accordingly, in view of the judicially-implied nature of the private action under section 10(b), Justice Rehnquist found it appropriate for the Court to weigh policy considerations in delimiting its bounds. 31 Finding significant policy reasons for retaining the Birnbau~m limitation on 10b-5 actions, he nevertheless acknowledged that the plaintiffs in Blue Chip could be granted relief without causing the problems envisioned under a complete repudiation of the Birnbaum rule. 32 . On a related point, the Court expressed concern over the "disruption of normal business activities" caused by frivolous suits. 421 U.S. at 743. This disruption would be increased, according to Justice Rehnquist, by use of the "shifting and highly fact oriented" standard which would accompany abandonment of Birnbaum. Id. at 755. The Court's fear for the instability of the standard which would arise if the Birnbaum rule were rejected was based on its belief that judicial outcomes would "turn largely on which oral version of a series of occurrences the jury may decide to credit." Id. ) for a discussion of the diverse treatment courts have given to scienter. Justice Powell, looking directly to the statute, did not discuss the role of common law fraud in Ernst & Ernst. He found that the text of the statute itself required that scienter be present and thus did not enter the debate over the role of common law fraud under section 10(b). This is consistent with his emphasis on the statute as the foundation of the rule, since the term "fraud" was introduced into rule lOb-5 but is not found in the statute itself. See note 58 infra.
38. 96 S. CL at 1385-87. As in Blue Chip, the SEC, which has been active in expanding the private right of action, filed an amicus brief for the plaintiffs. procedural limitations which Congress placed on the civil remedies which it expressly provided elsewhere in the statute." 9 In a passage which echoed Justice Harlan's earlier concerns, Justice Powell reasoned that these carefully drawn Congressional limitations would be nullified if the Court made negligent misconduct actionable under lOb-5, with its broad procedural advantages. 40 In light of his conclusion that the statute and its history gave a clear answer on the negligence issue, Justice Powell noted that the policy considerations invoked in the Blue Chip decision did not need to be reached. 41 Taken together, Blue Chip and Ernst & Ernst establish a new method for analyzing the proper scope of the private right of action under rule lOb-5. The Court will first examine the statute and the rule; if the answer is unclear from the text, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence will be consulted. Where the Court remains uncertain of the proper construction, it is not clear whether it will weigh policy considerations as it did in Blue Chip. Despite their differences, both Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist accept the statute as carefully drawn. The implication of this view is that the competing policy choices have already been weighed and decided upon by Congress, and that the Court should therefore limit itself to a careful search for clues to congressional intent, rather than attempt an independent reevaluation of policy factors.
Although the flexible approach toward lOb-5 taken in earlier cases has not been specifically rejected, there is strong evidence that it has fallen from favor. In Blue Chip, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the Court's prior holdings that rule lOb-5 should be construed flexibly. 42 He noted, however, that the private cause of action under 1Ob-5 is a judicial creation which must "be judicially delimited one way or another unless and until Congress addresses the question; ' 43 hence, the more 39. 96 S. Ct. at 1387-89. Justice Powell noted, as Justice Harlan had earlier, see note 17 supra, that those bringing suit under sections 11, 12(2) and 15 of the 1933 Act must post a bond for costs. He also pointed to the reduced statute of limitations in section 13, which applies to those suing under sections 11, 12(2), and 15. He stressed that two of these procedural safeguards, the shortened statute of limitations and the security for costs provision of section l(e), particularly concerned Congress, as they were added to the concluded, section 10(b) does not provide the protection which Congress apparently felt to be a necessary adjunct to negligence liability.
The SEC was criticized for attempting to "add a gloss" to the statutory language by arguing that the Court should focus on the effect of the alleged fraudulent practice on the investor, rather than directing its attention to whether the alleged fraud was negligent or intentional. 49 The speaking for the court in Green, asserted that . . . Rule 10b-5 must be interpreted and applied so as to accomplish the purpose for which it was intended. That this requires a generous reading is too obvious for comment. 54 He went on to argue that a finding of fraud under 10b-5 was not dependent upon the presence of misrepresentation, concluding that an equitable definition of fraud 55 would include situations in which controlling shareholders breached their "fiduciary duty to deal fairly with In general, the analysis which follows will focus on Green; analysis of Marshel would, in the context of this Note, parallel that of Green.
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It should be noted that in both Marshel and Green the plaintiff would have had standing under the forced-seller exception to the Birnbaum rule. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) . Whether this exception has survived Blue Chip is at least questionable. Allowing the forced-seller exception would seem not to raise the specter of fact-oriented case-by-case erosion of Birnbaum which concerned Justice Rehnquist. In the forced-seller situation, a complaint will not depend entirely on oral testimony, and Birnbaum will itself be satisfied by the formality of completion of the merger, at which time the minority will have exchanged its stock for either the offered price or the appraised price. See notes 24-34 supra and accompanying text. One commentator, however, has already concluded that the forced-seller exception is no longer valid. Gallagher Fraud, indeed, in the sense of a court of equity properly includes all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence, justly reposed, and are injurious to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. The recognition that "fraud" as that term is used in § 10(b) must be interpreted broadly was given further impetus by the Supreme Court's decision in [Bankers Life] where, in holding that fraud forming the basis of a lob-5 suit need not be intrinsic to the securities transaction itself, the unanimous Court stated that "Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically or restrictively . .. .
In the context of the Powell-Rehnquist analysis, with its heavy emphasis on the text of the statute, it is worthy of note that, contrary to the implication of Judge Mansfield's concurrence, the term "fraud" appears nowhere in the text of section 10(b); rather, it is derived from rule IOb-5. 62. See note 7 supra. In order to find deception, one would need to refer to the investor's expectations at the time the stock was purchased, see Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965), and argue that the corporation had failed to disclose that the shareholder might be forced to resell his stock to the corporation in a going private transaction. This already tenuous argument is further complicated by the existence of short-form merger statutes in many states, under which scope of the statute, a procedure such as that employed in Green must therefore involve either deception or manipulation. It is difficult to see how going private under a short-form merger statute would constitute a deceptive device in itself. The decision in Green did not rest upon the limited nondisclosure allegations in the complaint; 3 the court held specifically that "[i]f there is no valid corporate purpose for the merger, then even the most brazen disclosure of that fact to the minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent conduct." ' 4 Absent deception, a decision for a plaintiff under the facts of for all such plaintiffs; it is not uncommon -for majority shareholders contemplating going private to omit dividends or misrepresent the corporation's future prospects in an effort to depress the value of the minority's interest and acquire it inexpensively. . 1976) . The court held that "manipulation of the market price of the stock by eliminating dividends, with prior full disclosure" did not violate rule 10b-5. Id. at 983, 987. The court distinguished Green and Marshel on the ground that in those cases the shareholders attacked the going private merger itself as fraud. In Marsh the attack was not on the merger, in which the minority shareholders were given a chance to remain in the surviving company, but on its terms. The Sixth Circuit concluded that deception must be alleged to maintain a claim where the purpose of the merger is not challenged. The Court has also expressed concern for providing clearly delineated legal standards in order to ensure certainty in business transactions. The dispute reduces to nothing but a difference of opinion as to value. Indeed it is difficult to imagine a case under the short merger statute in which there could be such actual fraud as would entitle a minority to set aside the merger. This is so because the very purpose of the statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise. Thereafter the former stockholder has only a monetary claim. This power of the parent corporation to eliminate the minority is a complete answer to plaintiff's charge of breach of trust against the Green raised the question of the relationship between federal securities statutes and state law governing fiduciary relationships-the extent to which a federal court can redefine the boundaries of such corporate relationships after a state has expressly approved a method of dealing. While this may be in part a question of preemption, it is also an aspect of the question of federal-state comity. Where, as in the case of section 10(b), the federal statute is not clear in its reach, then this factor should at least give pause to a federal court before a federal remedy is expanded at the expense of state law. portantly, the Court demonstrated that it will no longer accept the equity-oriented, flexible approach which the lower courts have followed in expanding the scope of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. As a replacement the Court has substituted a tightly reasoned method of analysis which rests firmly on the language of the statute and the intent with which the language was used by Congress. The Court's current approach to lOb-5 questions apparently does not threaten the continued existence of the private right of action under rule lOb-5. However, its position does reflect the concerns expressed by the early cases and the commentators over the need for harmonizing the remedy provided by the private right of action under lOb-5 with the specific remedies provided in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. These concerns had been ignored by the Supreme Court in its previous lOb-5 cases. The Court's new emphasis on a strict construction of the statute promises to have a profound effect on future actions brought under.rule lOb-5. As for those who had hoped to obtain federal relief in a going private situation, it appears that they will have to wait for some action by Congress while continuing to rely on existing state remedies.
legislative role. The next step may lie in the direction of congressional consideration of a Federal Securities Code. The ALI's work on such a code has already produced three drafts which would codify over 20 changes in the 10b-5 area. See id. at 1196-97.
